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ABSTRACT
Although Surrealist writing has literary merit, Surrealist texts were written as
revolutionary tracts meant to undermine the social order. Yet the politically radical
aspects of the movement are no longer taken very seriously. At least one contributing
factor to the current impotence of Surrealism is the approach taken in the translation of
Surrealist texts. Many translators have presented Surrealist texts as they would
traditionally present any literary document. However, Walter Benjamin’s writings on
translation, in particular his essay “The Task of the Translator,” provide a novel
conception of translation, one which can produce linguistically radical texts. I will argue
that the Benjaminian approach to translating Surrealism promises to reinvigorate
Surrealism for modern readers.

Keywords: French Literature, Surrealism, Translation, Louis Aragon, André Breton,
Walter Benjamin
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION:
THE DEATH OF SURREALISM
Maurice Nadeau opens his monumental 1944 work Histoire du Surréalisme by
exclaiming: “A history of surrealism—then surrealism must be dead!” (35). This phrase
is meant to be ironic, but there is perhaps more truth in the words than Nadeau intended.
Through their experiments with language and art, the surrealists endeavor to overthrow
what they see as the oppressive logic of fascism and capitalism dominant in inter-war
Europe. Their texts are revolutionary tracts distributed with the intent of undermining the
extant social order. Today, however, surrealism has lost its edge. Surrealist works are
widely available, but they are only seen as the subject of literary study. The revolutionary
ambitions of the movement are no longer taken seriously. The contemporary concept of
surrealism has become associated with the simply bizarre. For many, to call a work of
literature “surrealistic” is only to differentiate it by emphasizing some weird or
incomprehensible characteristic.
Surrealism certainly stands out among other literary styles, but what makes
surrealism unique is not simply its strange content. The movement is designed to be
radically different from established conventions. Indeed, “literature” in the traditional
sense is part of what the surrealists are revolting against. The aspirations of the surrealist
movement are greater in scope than mere literary expression. What the surrealists hope to
achieve is nothing short of “a total transformation of life” (Nadeau 36). For this reason, it
1

is particularly damning for surrealism to be reduced to the level of literature. However,
this is Nadeau’s conclusion in the retrospective afterward included in the 1957 edition of
his Histoire du Surréalisme: “Until further notice, we must resign ourselves to
considering surrealism as a literary school” (230).
However, Walter Benjamin is a contemporary of the surrealists who sees the
potential of their movement outside the scope of literature. As he observes in his 1929
essay, “Surrealism: The Last Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia”: “the writings of
this circle are not literature but something else--demonstrations, watchwords, documents,
bluffs, forgeries if you will, but at any rate not literature” (208). Benjamin has respect for
the political radicalism of the surrealists, as he goes on to say: “Since Bakunin, Europe
has lacked a radical concept of freedom. The Surrealists have one” (215). In many ways
Benjamin’s theories are complimentary to those of surrealism. Specifically, I will show
that Benjamin’s re-conception of translation, as proposed in his essay “The Task of the
Translator,” promises to help revitalize the now inert revolutionary project called for in
surrealist writings. By being reproduced in translation the texts can take on an “afterlife,”
giving them a new relevance and power.
The project to reinvigorate surrealism for a twenty-first century public is not an
inconsequential one. The surrealist movement can be seen as a desperate groping for
identity in a world on the cusp of the popular culture boom. It is perhaps telling that the
opening line of Nadja is “Who am I?” (9)1. The setting of the surrealist narratives is a
Paris in the midst of a major city planning project to homogenize the city. While the
authorities were redrawing the city to make it more consumer-friendly, cinemas, music
1

«Qui suis-je?»
Unless otherwise noted, all translations of Breton’s Nadja and Manifeste du Surréalisme are mine.
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halls, and neon signs were propagating a rhetoric of conformity. Surrealism attempts to
preserve uniqueness by using Freudian tools to dig deep within the subconscious, far
away from the homogeneous world of logic and culture. The surrealist project to reclaim
one’s identity seems even more valid today. If persistent homogenization is a provoking
force for surrealism, then we could expect that we have even more reason to revolt. We
are bombarded by more homogenizing forces than the surrealists ever were in the 1920’s
and 30’s. Technology now does much of our thinking for us. You cannot finish typing a
query into a search bar before it is guessed what you are (or perhaps should be) searching
for. Insisting that his work remain unedited, Aragon demanded that even the spelling
mistakes in his manuscript remain in the printed version of Traité du style (Treatise 3).
Today, spelling mistakes are often corrected before you notice you have made them.
In this paper, we will begin by reviewing some of the history of the surrealist
movement. By analyzing the events that fractured the movement, in particular the
notorious “Aragon affair,” we will understand some of the theoretical tensions that
penetrate surrealism. Specifically, we will see that there is a divide between the
surrealists on the kind of action needed to effect the promised revolution. While Louis
Aragon insists that direct engagement in party politics is necessary, André
Breton places the greatest emphasis on the subversive potential of unadulterated creative
experimentation. This discussion will help frame our present endeavor. Next, we will
discuss some of the unique difficulties surrounding translating surrealism, arriving at the
conclusion that a traditional approach is not suited for the task. Finally, we will explore
the possibilities opened up by Benjamin’s theories on translation.
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CHAPTER 2
MAKING SENSE OF THE ARAGON AFFAIR
Surrealism was dealt a number of heavy blows in its complicated history as one of
the most important intellectual movements of the twentieth century, but none as harsh as
the loss of one of the movement’s co-founders, Louis Aragon. His departure was
preceded by that of several other fixtures of surrealism and followed by even more, but
his break with the movement was by far the most infamous. In 1932, Aragon left the
surrealist movement, adopting instead the socialist realism endorsed by the communist
party. There has been something of a tradition in the study of surrealism to view
Aragon’s departure as a result of his conformity to the growing trend of communism or
his lack of rigor as a thinker. This trend undoubtedly owes its origins to the harsh
criticisms of surrealist leader André Breton who lost a friend and ally in the fallout from
the “Aragon affair,” as it came to be known. However, we will see that Aragon’s break
with the movement was not a superficial shift of allegiances. Rather, it was the result of
intellectual differences between Breton and Aragon extending from their preferred forms
of political action to their conceptions of surrealism and even to their understanding of
the nature of human expression.
Breton continued to write commentaries on surrealism well after World War II.
These writings profoundly influenced the way surrealism was viewed for much of the
twentieth century. But scholarship in a post-Bretonian world has shed new light on the
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departure of Aragon and many of the other surrealists. There is now a view that the crises
which fractured the surrealist movement resulted from contradictions in the movement’s
doctrines which Breton was unable to resolve and on which he was unwilling to
compromise. The primary catalyst for the resulting and inevitable split in the surrealist
movement was the influence of communism and the uneasy rapport it held with
surrealism.
Though surrealism would later come to identify itself with communism, the
relationship between the two was at first somewhat hostile. Louis Aragon made his early
skepticism about communism very clear when, in 1925, he wrote to the communist
periodical Clarté to defend an earlier statement in which he referred to the Moscow
government as “moronic”:
You have chosen to isolate as an attack a phrase which bears witness to my lack of enthusiasm for
the Bolshevik government, and with it for all communism… I have always placed, and place
today, the spirit of revolt far above any politics… The Russian Revolution? Forgive me for
shrugging my shoulders. On the level of ideas, it is, at best, a vague ministerial crisis. (Nadeau
101)

It is shocking to consider that these words were written by the same person who, only six
years later, wrote in his poem “Front Rouge”: “Fire on the trained bears of the social
democracy… Fire I tell you / Under the leadership of the Communist Party / the SFIC…
Glory to / The Red / Army” (Nadeau 288-293). What could have motivated this radical
change of opinion which ultimately led to his formal break with the surrealist movement
he had helped to create?
Aragon’s shift has been interpreted very differently by commentators on
surrealism. Some see it as a sign of intellectual weakness. Surrealism scholar Gérard
Durozoi describes Aragon as a “Theoretician of ‘mentir-vrai’ – ‘lying the truth’ – who
played on his different masks and created multiple reflections, as if to avoid the
5

condemnation – more moral than literary – with which successive generations would
judge him” (650). This seems to follow the tradition established by Breton to see
Aragon’s actions as “political opportunism” (Nadeau 181).
Juxtaposed against these interpretations are those, such as that of literary scholar
Roger Shattuck, which describe Aragon as a somewhat tortured figure, struggling, like
the other surrealists to make sense of “‘the contradiction he carried within him’ –namely
between dialectic materialism and surrealist idealism” (18). In most insightful accounts of
Aragon’s motives in leaving surrealism, there are two contradictory, yet fundamentally
“surrealist” ideologies pitted against each other: a politically-oriented, Marxist,
dialectical materialism and an a less explicitly political, metaphysical idealism. Early in
the movement’s history, while its ambitions were still nebulous, it was easier for the
surrealists to reconcile these conflicting attitudes. But as the movement progressed, the
divide deepened and Aragon and Breton found themselves on opposite ends of the rift.
This much is clear even if the exact nature of the rift and the true motives of each side
remain contested.
Of course this only leads to further questions. Why was Aragon forced to choose
between surrealism and party communism if surrealism was officially aligned with the
French Communist Party? In answering these questions, Aragon could be allowed to
speak for himself; there are several passages that shed light on his views and motivations.
However, in approaching the topic it would perhaps be best to follow Aragon’s own
wisdom: “I would like you to note that what I shout is not generated spontaneously. I do
not believe in the parthenogenesis of my violence, but in its determinism” (Treatise 111).
Therefore, before Aragon himself is consulted to understand the motivations behind these
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events, the difficult relationship between communism and surrealism must be traced back
to its origins. It will be seen that the Aragon affair was not without precedent, and that it
was actually symptomatic of a crisis that had been afflicting the movement for years.
The relationship between surrealism and communism had always been uneasy. As
illustrated earlier, Aragon and the other surrealists were hesitant about endorsing politics
of any kind in the movement’s fledgling period; they saw their aims as occupying a
higher realm of concern. However, it seems that the revolution promised by communism
was too enticing for them to deny forever. The movement did not share communism’s
interest in the “amelioration of the abominable earthly comfort” (Nadeau 123), as Breton
made very clear. However, surrealism and communism found common ground in the
mutual desire to destroy the bourgeoisie and its oppressive values. In 1925, the surrealists
began to improve their rapport with the editors of Clarté, brought together at first by a
shared hatred of France’s actions in the Moroccan war. The two groups began a
collaboration that saw the complete reversal of many surrealists’ views on communism.
The change was profound as historian and literary scholar Roger Short noted: “Aragon
was soon writing with the conviction and facility of a lifelong Marxist. In articles such as
‘Le Prolétariat de l’esprit’, he showed how capital could turn ideas themselves into
commodities” (8). This article appeared in Clarté only months after Aragon’s
denouncement of communism had appeared in the same journal (Nadeau 117-124) (Short
6-10).
Did this reversal signify a transformation of the surrealist movement into another
sect of the same youthful communist intellectualism that was forming the roots of French
existentialism at this time? It would appear not. True to surrealist form, the movement
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backed out of the clartéist alliance as easily as it had established it. Fearing for their
autonomy, the surrealists refused to combine editorial efforts with Clarté in the proposed
review La Guerre Civile, and instead continued to publish their own journal La
Révolution Surréaliste (Nadeau 117-124) (Short 6-10). On the surface this hesitation was
met with little resentment from the Clarté group. Marcel Fourrier of Clarté wrote
optimistically:
It would obviously be absurd at the present time to ask the surrealists to renounce surrealism.
Have they asked the communists to renounce communism? In short, it is better that the projected
experiment has not yet occurred, but still remains in the future (Nadeau 124).

The reality, however, was that this flirtation with communism would lead the surrealists
down a path that would divide them bitterly rather than unite them with the other
revolutionary sects.
Even as early as 1926, Fourrier’s optimism was not shared by all. Pierre Naville
became frustrated with surrealism and left the movement to join the editorial staff of
Clarté. This departure proved prophetic and it was accompanied by Naville’s insight that
surrealism could not reconcile the two contradictory attitudes it attempted to hold
simultaneously. There was a “metaphysical attitude,” which Naville described as a
“theoretical speculation on the data of internal experience and of a certain experience of
external objects and events” (Nadeau 128). This perspective maintained that liberation of
the mind must precede political revolution. The metaphysical attitude is juxtaposed
against a “dialectical attitude,” which he claimed was concerned with the “progress of the
mind according to its consciousness of itself” (Nadeau 128). On the contrary, this
perspective would show that a political revolution must take place before the mind can be
liberated (Nadeau 127-132).

8

Naville presented the potential for surrealist activism as a dichotomy between
political engagement and automatic, literary experimentation. If this criticism were
correct, it would seriously undermine the surrealist project, limiting it to either a mere
literary movement or another arm of the communist political machine. This bifurcation
would be devastating for a movement as opposed to literary establishment as it was to
party politics. Breton struggled to defend surrealism as a whole greater than its
contradictory parts. Ironically, it was precisely this attempt to preserve the movement that
led to its disintegration, as Robert Short noted:
Breton’s efforts to make Surrealism an effective revolutionary force while maintaining its
independence by steering a course between the Scylla of assimilation into the art world and the
Charybdis of absorption by the communist party, caused casualties on the left of the group as well
as on the right (15)

To demonstrate that they were willing to contribute to the political revolution as
well as that of the mind, five leading surrealists, Aragon, Breton, Éluard, Péret, and Unik,
joined the communist party in 1927 (Nadeau 135). However, because they refused to
surrender their autonomy, they found themselves alienated within the party. The
communists were skeptical of the surrealists, who obviously had a very different set of
objectives. This animosity was mutual; the surrealists did not share many of the views of
the party and resented the journalistic assignments that it issued them. In the end, little
came of this communist alignment, and the surrealist movement continued to operate
mostly outside the party (Short 10-15).
Though Breton attempted to address Naville’s criticisms, he failed to reconcile the
“metaphysical” attitude with the “dialectical” one, which ultimately forced the surrealist
movement into two separate camps. Why did the movement struggle so much with these
seemingly conflicting concepts of idealism (which was linked to the “metaphysical
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attitude”) and dialectical materialism? This likely extends back to the profound influence
of Hegelian philosophy on surrealist theory. Hegel’s theories place a strong, idealist
emphasis on the mind. Through Hegel’s dialectical progression, the mind (in a
distinctively Hegelian sense of the word) develops and eventually attains absolute
freedom. This inspired the surrealists to seek a “revolution of the mind,” a final negation
that would lead to the freedom promised by the dialectic. It is this devotion to Hegelian
principles that stimulated the movement’s difficult relationship with communism, as
Short observed:
They had long believed that the Hegelian dialectic was the key to the resolution of conflicts in the
real world and that Hegelianism found its own historical resolution in Marxism. This logic, they
said, brought them face to face with the communist party to which, as Surrealists, they had no
alternative to offer. (10)

Ultimately Naville’s predictions came true, and the two ideologies were pried
apart by political pressures: dialectical materialism prescribed political action, while
idealism chafed under such practical, worldly concerns. In 1932, Aragon gravitated
toward the politics of communism. Breton was thrown out of the communist party in
1933, after which he mostly avoided direct engagement in politics. Maurice Nadeau
summed it up best when he said:
Each crisis expressed the collision, within the movement, of the surrealist forces and the
communist forces, or the disharmony between the level of mind and that of facts: the surrealist
Robert Desnos was unwilling to become a communist, the communist Aragon could no longer be
a surrealist. If the two paths were parallel, they could no longer intersect. (202-203)

This intellectual conflict was made very apparent during the unfolding of the
notorious Aragon affair. The scandal involved Aragon’s departure from the surrealist
group in 1932 as a result of his renewed commitment to the French Communist Party
following a somewhat mysterious trip to Russia. The events begin in late 1930, when
Louis Aragon traveled to Moscow with fellow surrealist Georges Sadoul. Aragon himself
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remained obscure about the reasons for the trip saying only: “As you may know, at the
end of 1930, Georges Sadoul and I went to Russia. We went there more willingly in
Russia than elsewhere, much more willingly: that is all I have to say about the reasons for
our departure!” (Nadeau 177). Though Aragon was evasive about the topic at the time, it
has since been established that his original motives for traveling to Russia were mostly
personal. Aragon’s lover and future wife, Elsa Triolet, urged him to take her to see her
sister in Russia (Durozoi 231). Sadoul, fearing imprisonment for sedition, urged Aragon
to go and take him along (Shattuck 18).
While in Russia, Aragon and Sadoul were invited to serve as French delegates to
the International Conference of Revolutionary Writers in Kharkov. During the
proceedings the two surrealists were pressured into denouncing key components of
Bretonian surrealism: idealism, Freudianism, Trotskyism, etc. and to retract their support
of the Second Manifeste du Surréalisme. Upon his return, Aragon attempted to reassure
the surrealists to his commitment to their movement with writings like “Aux intellectuels
révolutionnaires.” However, it became increasingly clear that his commitment to party
communism was stronger (Durozoi 231-233).
After he published the violent poem “Front Rouge” for Littérature de la
Révolution mondiale in late 1931, the French government charged Aragon with inciting
murder, citing lines from the poem such as “Kill the cops / comrades / Kill the cops”
(Nadeau 287-288). André Breton rushed to Aragon’s defense. While condemning the
content of the poem (to Breton, it was little more than communist propaganda), Breton
successfully defended Aragon’s rights as a poet against legal recourse. Aragon, unable to
accept Breton’s criticism of the Communist Party and its endorsed literature, had an
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announcement of his formal withdrawal from surrealism posted in L’Humanité in early
1932 (Durozoi 231-233).
At this point, a question comes to mind: if the movement was being pulled in two
opposite directions, what caused Aragon to gravitate toward the perspective of the
communist party, rather than Breton’s? Nadeau attributes Aragon’s polarization to the
dialectical side of surrealism to external pressures: “Aragon merely followed the current
that with increasing power swept the advanced intellectuals of every nation toward the
USSR” (181). Aragon held the Marxist, dialectical attitude to the exclusion of the
metaphysical, idealist attitude, which alienated him from those like Breton, who still tried
to reconcile both. This tendency to see Aragon’s shift as a result of the external influence
of the intellectual climate is supported by Breton’s retrospective descriptions of his
former friend’s personality: “His mental agility was unparalleled, whence perhaps the
noticeable laxity of his opinions and, also, a certain suggestibility… The one clear danger
was his over-eagerness to please” (Taylor viii).
However, to reduce Aragon’s communist sympathies to the influence of an
intellectual trend seems like an overly simplistic explanation. Could the influence of a
trip to Russia have so easily reversed all of Aragon’s surrealist ideals? Could he have
been so impressionable? It seems, rather, that his communism is not so easily attributed
to keeping up with the fashions of the time. His departure from surrealism was not an
instantaneous, unjustified shift of ideas. The events of the Aragon affair were the
inevitable result of a gradual progression of Aragon’s political, philosophical, and artistic
ideals, a set of principles that put him at odds with Breton and other surrealists.
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It seems evident that Aragon’s social consciousness had always been greater than
other surrealists like Breton. In “Passage de l’Opéra,” the first section of his narrative
Paysan de Paris, which was published in 1926, before he joined the communist party,
Aragon describes the working class victims of the Boulevard Haussmann Building
Society, which very poorly compensated the owners of the shops that would be
demolished for the construction of the Boulevard Haussmann. He depicts the merchants
of the Passage de l’Opéra in a very sympathetic light, describing “the seething fury
rightly felt by all inhabitants of this place” (25), and exposes the corruption of a “justice,
which in this instance is not only slow but suspiciously blind in one eye” (26). Compare
this to Breton’s social commentary in Nadja which reveals an equal level of disgust for
the mechanisms of capitalism but far less sympathy for the working class:
It is not the martyrdom that one suffers that creates this liberty. It is… a perpetual unchaining…
These steps do you suppose them capable of making them? Have they the time for them, even?
Have they the heart for them? Good people, you said, yes, good like those that get themselves
killed in the war, right? … Many unhappy people and some poor imbeciles. (79)2

Of course, Aragon’s communism was not only informed by his social awareness;
it was also precipitated by theoretical factors. In his introduction to his English translation
of Paysan de Paris (Paris Peasant) Simon Watson Taylor shows that Aragon’s
materialism is evident even in this relatively early surrealist narrative: “‘The Peasant’s
Dream’ may be seen as a ‘corrective’ to the preceding segment of the book… [it] not
only calls to a halt the idealism implicit in the first two parts of the book; it also
represents the opposite spirit of the automatism cherished by most of the early

2

Ce n’est pas le martyre qu’on subit qui crée cette liberté. Elle est… un désenchaînement perpétuel… Ces
pas, les supposez-vous capable de les faire ? En ont-ils le temps, seulement ? En ont-ils le cœur ? De braves
gens, disiez-vous, oui, braves comme ceux qui se sont fait tuer à la guerre, n’est-ce pas ? … beaucoup de
malheureux et quelques pauvres imbéciles.
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surrealists.” Taylor further exposes the meaning of the text by quoting Aragon’s memoir,
which described Paysan de Paris as
The novel of what I was at that time… the evolution of a mind, starting with a mythological
conception of the world, and leading towards a materialism which is not achieved in the final
pages of the book, but only promised within the terms of a proclamation of the failure of
Hegelianism, the loftiest of all those conceptions which allowed man to advance along the path of
idealism. (xi)

In this way, Paysan de Paris could be interpreted as a kind of Bildungsroman for Aragon.
It follows his progression from the idealism he espoused at the formation of the surrealist
movement to the beginnings of the dialectical materialism he came to embrace as he
matured as a writer and thinker.
The result of this evolution can be seen in its most philosophical form as the
strong emphasis on the concrete over the abstract in “The Peasant’s Dream.” In this
section Aragon claims that he “condemn[s] the idealists, the mind condemns them,” and
that he regards God as “a disgusting and vulgar idea.” He denies that “God is the purpose
of metaphysics” (193), holding instead that “Notion, or knowledge of the concrete is,
then, the purpose of all metaphysics” (195). He also endeavors to show that logic and
metaphysics are separate entities: “the purpose of logic is abstract knowledge, and the
purpose of metaphysics is concrete knowledge” (194-195). It is for this reason that he
directly criticizes Hegel, calling his The Doctrine of Essence “a useless intermediary that
allowed him to pass from logic to metaphysics after having originally compounded them.
Yet all that was necessary was to maintain their individualities” (195). He concludes that
“madness is the predominance of the abstract and the general over the concrete,” and that
his concern “is with metaphysics not with madness. And not reason” (202). Therefore, he
rejects Hegelianism and idealism and embraces what he calls “a poetic life” (203),
believing that “the concrete has no other form of expression than poetry” (201-202).
14

Others have shown that the unfolding of the Aragon affair revealed more than a
political or philosophical conflict, but one that extended to the nature of artistic
expression. As Robert Short posits:
“Ultimately, the differences between Breton on one side and Aragon and the communists on the
other were about the nature of communication. For Breton, a writer’s ‘meaning’ lay in the words
he wrote and the intention behind them; their subversive value was latent within them. For
Aragon, meaning lay solely in the interpretation made by the reader or by the majority of society
at any given time.” (17)

The stakes of this argument were high. If Breton’s idealist perspective is correct,
subjecting oneself to unwavering political commitments is not only unnecessary but
detrimental to the purity of one’s writing. On the other hand, if Aragon’s materialist
perspective is correct, surrealist writing will be worthless until a political revolution takes
place and creates social conditions in which such writing will be fully intelligible to the
public. Short tries to show that the two men’s beliefs about writing informed their
politics, rather than vice versa: “Aragon concluded that unswerving service to the
revolution was the writer’s first duty not merely for the sake of his ideals as a man but for
the sake of the validity of his writing” (17).
Thinking of writing as the source of the break between Aragon and Breton makes
sense when it is considered that what finally triggered Aragon’s official departure was
Breton’s “defense” of “Front Rouge”(“Red Front”) against legal action. In arguing that
Aragon could not be criminally charged for the contents of his poetry, he also insults
Aragon’s work and ideals:
In the Manifeste du Surréalisme, I insisted, in the name of the poetic conception my friends and I
maintained, on disengaging the author’s responsibility entirely in cases when certain texts of
incontestable “automatic” character were incriminated… Of course I am not claiming that the
poem “Red Front” corresponds to the definition of an automatic text… On the other hand, I
believe that the poetic position which is determined today for Aragon by the twelve or fifteen
books he has written can in no way be sacrificed to the agitation which some find opportune to
provoke around one of his poems which they by exception turn into a model of conscious thought
(296-297) … recalling finally that it was written during Aragon’s stay in the USSR, [I] regard it…
as a poem of circumstance (303).

15

Breton criticizes the poem for not being automatic enough to be considered authentically
surrealist, condemning it for being written with a specific purpose in mind. Further, the
description of “Front Rouge” as “a poem of circumstance.” amounts to Breton calling it a
piece of propaganda. However, he defends Aragon’s rights by citing the surrealist
principle of rejecting authorial control and responsibility. These points are a tremendous
insult to Aragon, who was skeptical of strict automatic writing and willing to accept
responsibility for whatever he wrote:
We all know that surrealism is a conscious form of inspiration… Surrealism is inspiration
recognized, accepted and put to work (Treatise 94) … Thus surrealism is not a refuge from style.
It is too simplistic to believe that in surrealism form and content are indifferent (Treatise 95) … If
you write deplorable twaddle using surrealist techniques, it will still be deplorable twaddle
(Treatise 96). I care enormously about what I write and I claim full responsibility for it (Treatise
115).

Breton seems to be criticizing Aragon for an artistic shift. There is no doubt that
Aragon was undergoing a change, but to what degree? Was Aragon’s poem “Front
Rouge” as much of a radical stylistic departure as Breton claims it to be? Perhaps Aragon
was not leaving behind surrealism altogether. But rather, as seen above, his
understanding of surrealism was different than that of Breton. For example, consider this
selection from “Front Rouge”:
Your turn Communist Youth / Sweep away the human debris where there linger still / the
incantatory spider of the sign of the cross / Volunteers of socialist construction / Drive before you
the past like a dangerous dog / Rise up against your mothers / Abandon night pestilence and
family (290)… The universe must hear / a voice shouting the glory of materialist dialectics…
Glory to materialist dialectics / and glory to its incarnation / The Red / Army (293)

Compare this to a selection from Aragon’s Paysan de Paris, an undeniably surrealist text:
Young People will plunge passionately into this serious, unprofitable game. It will pervert the
course of their lives. The Faculties will be deserted, the laboratories closed down. The very idea of
armies, families, professions will become inconceivable. Then, in the face of this ever-increasing
disaffection of social life, a great conspiracy of all the dogmatic and realist forces of the world will
be organized against the phantom of illusions. It will win, this coalition of powers dedicated to the
principles of why-not and making-the-best-of-it. But it will be the last crusade of the mind. And
for this battle that is lost in advance I recruit you today, adventurous, grave hearts, contemptuous
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of victory, who search the night for an abyss into which to hurl yourselves. Come, the roster is
open. Queue up at this window please. (67)

These selections reveal shocking parallels between two texts that are supposedly so
different. Each is a description of the impending revolution with which the surrealists
were so fascinated. Both include descriptions of a youth in revolt and an overthrow of
social institutions. The major difference between the two is the driving force of the
revolution and the level of confidence in its success. The selection from Paysan de Paris
is concerned with the idealist “revolution of the mind,” and it seems doomed to failure.
“Front Rouge,” on the other hand, describes a social revolution as the inevitable result of
the dialectical materialist progression, and its success is equally inevitable. Upon
analysis, it is clear that the content of Aragon’s later writing was not as different as
Breton had described it. If Aragon’s writing had changed it was as a result of his
definitive rejection of idealism and his embrace of materialism.
In conclusion, Louis Aragon’s separation from surrealism (and the fracturing of
the movement in general) should be understood as the inevitable conclusion of an
inconsistency in surrealist theory. The tension between the idealism and materialism
present in surrealism manifests itself as a fork in the road of revolutionary activity. If
Breton is correct and meaningful sociopolitical change is only possible after a radical
conceptual shift, then the creative and theoretical fields are the locus of revolutionary
potential. But if, as Aragon believes, surrealism is not the agent of social change but
rather something possible once it has been effected, then revolutionary energies are
perhaps better invested in more traditional channels, such as those of party communism.
A project to reinvigorate surrealism on its own terms is thus somewhat committed to the
Bretonian approach, since for Aragon such an attempt would be futile unless coupled
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with more direct political engagement. Yet in many ways, Aragon’s view has been
vindicated. Regardless of our assessment of communism’s success, it is clear that it has
had more of a political impact than Bretonian surrealism. For nearly a century, surrealism
has been confined to artistic and literary spheres without bringing about the conceptual
revolution that Breton anticipates in his 1924 Manifeste du Surréalisme: “I believe in the
future resolution of these two states, in appearance so contradictory, which are dream and
reality, in a kind of absolute reality, of surreality” (24).3 In order to understand how the
perception of surrealism has been unable to rise above the status of a literary movement,
it will be beneficial to discuss how it has been presented to the Anglophone world,
especially in the context of our translation project.

3

« Je crois à la résolution future de ces deux états, en apparence si contradictoires, que sont le rêve et la
réalité, en une sorte de réalité absolue, de surréalité. »
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CHAPTER 3
TRANSLATING REVOLT:
A REEXAMINATION OF SURREALISM IN TRANSLATION
Translation traditionally attempts to convey the meaning of a text from one
language to another for the sake of the reader unfamiliar with the original language.
However, this approach seems inappropriate for the surrealist movement, since meaning
is not its main preoccupation. As Benjamin explains: “Language takes precedence. Not
only before meaning. Also before the self” (Surrealism 208). As we will see, it is
language which will prove to be the locus of revolutionary potential. Indeed, a text is not
surrealist by virtue of its content or meaning but rather by the methodology employed to
write it. Specifically, surrealist texts are at least ostensibly “automatically” written,
meaning that the writer proceeds without any plan or specific purpose in mind and
refuses to revise the text. The unconscious characteristic of their writing is particularly
important for the surrealists, who revolt against logic and reason, believing that these
concepts are responsible for oppressive political structures. Once surrealist writing is
submitted to conscious revision, which it must be in order to be translated in the
traditional sense, its subversive spirit is diminished, if not completely destroyed. While it
may be tempting to use translations to make the surrealist oeuvre more accessible, one
must remember that the surrealists take pains to make their work inaccessible to the
public. For Benjamin as well, translation and creative endeavor in general, should not
become the means to a practical end directed at the reader (e.g. the attempt to make a
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work understandable to a foreign audience): “In the appreciation of art or an art form,
consideration of the receiver never proves fruitful” (The Task of the Translator 69). To
recapture the surrealist spirit of revolt, we must follow Benjamin’s lead and completely
rethink the task of the translator.
But what exactly is this revolutionary component of surrealist writing that is lost
in translation? One of the most important elements of the surrealist method of
composition is its “automatic” character. In André Breton’s Manifeste du Surréalisme,
considered to be the founding document of the organized movement, surrealism is
defined as a “Pure psychic automatism… dictated by thought in the absence of all control
exercised by reason, outside of all aesthetic or moral preoccupation” (36).4 The surrealists
typically engage in automatic writing, meaning they reject the authorial control central to
most literary endeavors. For Breton, calculating reason has rendered literature boring and
unimaginative: “The ambition of authors does not go very far” (Manifeste 17).5 His
ambitions go much farther; they are nothing short of revolutionary, in the full sense of the
term.
In response, Breton develops a surrealist methodology of automatic writing in the
Manifeste, instructing the surrealist writer on how best to minimize the intrusion of
conscious thought in the writing process. Indeed, automatic writing must proceed without
any plan or specific purpose in mind: “Write quickly without a preconceived subject,
quickly enough not to be tempted to reread” (41).6 Further, the section of the Manifeste
that concerns compositional method is entitled “Surrealist written composition, or first
4

« Automatisme psychique pur… Dictée de la pensée, en l’absence de tout contrôle exercé par la raison,
en dehors de toute préoccupation esthétique ou morale. »
5
6

« l’ambition des auteurs ne va pas très loin »
« Écrivez vite sans sujet préconçu, assez vite pour ne pas retenir et ne pas être tenté de vous relire
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and last draft,” indicating that any revision is out of the question (41).7 The surrealists
see themselves as “modest recording devices,” that is, they wish for their writing to be a
means of recording the activity of their unconscious minds (39). 8 An enthusiastic reader
of Freud, Breton hopes that surrealist endeavors will probe into the unconscious and
explore new domains.
Even if we accept that automatic writing can truly capture the contents of the
unconscious, what benefit could it hope to confer beyond some artistic novelty?
Surrealism is not only an act of defiance against boring novels; as we have seen, there is
also a political stake in the surrealist revolt (Manifeste 17). According to the surrealists,
in addition to diminishing the imagination of writers, reason deprives people of their
freedom and contentment. For Breton, “We are still living under the reign of logic” (19) 9.
This reign of logic subordinates all human activity to practical considerations: “Under the
pretext of progress, we have come to… proscribe all means of research into truth which
do not conform to usefulness” (20). 10 While this seems obviously problematic for the
poetic frame of mind, it is problematic for humanity in general. Human lives become a
dull and insufferable slavery to an absurd cycle of work and consumption. As Breton says
elsewhere of the inhabitants of such a world: These people would not know how to be
interesting to the extent to which they support work.” (Nadja 78). 11 Benjamin is also
concerned with the limitations imposed on the mind by the logic of work: “The perpetual
7

« Composition surréaliste écrite, ou premier et dernier jet»

8

« modestes appareils enregistreurs »,

9

« Nous vivons encore sous le règne de la logique »

10

«Sous prétexte de progrès, on est parvenu… à proscrire tout mode de recherche de la vérité qui n’est pas
conforme à l’usage. »
11

« Ces gens ne sauraient être intéressants dans la mesure où ils supportent le travail »
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readiness of volitional, discursive memory, encouraged by the technique of mechanical
reproduction, reduces the scope for the play of the imagination” (On Some Motifs in
Baudelaire 186). Surrealist writing promises to be a “War of independence” against the
tyranny of rationality, but only if the writing can successfully express an unconscious
spirit divorced from the normalizing influence of conscious thought (Manifeste 60).12
Translation, however, is a necessarily conscious process. Good translators exert a
great deal of mental effort to transfer the ideas and nuances of the original text into a new
language. This amount of conscious deliberation is typically warranted because the
fundamental incommensurability between languages and cultures is extremely difficult to
reconcile. But as we have seen, the surrealist ethic is opposed to conscious, rational
thought. What is worse, a translation is always an activity directed to a practical end of
conveying the meaning of a text to a new audience through another language. Since this
rational, pragmatic activity is always the product of at least one translator, it is an
example of the kind of work that the surrealists are trying to escape in their artistic
endeavors.
Further, a surrealist text, once translated, becomes another intellectual
commodity. The translator’s pretention to have conveyed the meaning of the text implies
that he or she has first discovered an objective meaning behind it. Once someone claims
to have uncovered its meaning, even the original loses its mysteriousness and therefore its
subversive potential. It is in this way that Breton’s (at least ostensibly) automatic work
Nadja has come to be perceived as a roman à clé. The difficult passages of the book
become puzzles that can be solved with scholarly attention. Then, thanks to the hard work

12

«guerre d’indépendence»
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of the academic community, it is repackaged, disseminated, and analyzed across the
world.
Critics may disagree about how to interpret or evaluate a surrealist work, but what
is universally agreed is that it can be rationally analyzed. After some semblance of
critical consensus is reached, the text is fitted into an intellectual schema and recorded in
the annals of literary encyclopedias before being left on a shelf to collect dust. There is
no revolutionary potential left in the book; it is just another novel, if a strange one.
Nothing could have frustrated the revolutionary ambitions of the surrealists more than to
see this happen to their work. The goal of surrealism is to produce troubling writing.
They want to undermine traditional literary forms by presenting a new form of expression
outside the confines of reason. But if writing is capable of being translated, it is capable
of being rationalized. In this way, the bounds of literary tradition are simply expanded to
include the now impotent surrealist movement.
At this point, it would be useful to take a look at a translation of a brief passage of
surrealist text. In this way, we can see how, in translation, an automatic text must be
submitted to careful logical scrutiny. The opening to Breton’s Nadja will provide us with
an excellent example of the difficulties that might complicate a translation of a surrealist
(or indeed any) text: « Qui suis-je? Si par exception je m’en rapportais à un adage : en
effet pourquoi tout ne reviendrait-il pas à savoir qui je ‹hante › » (9) ? Literary scholar
Richard Howard offers this English translation : “Who am I ? If this once I were to rely
on a proverb, then perhaps everything would amount to knowing whom I ‘haunt’” (11).
Howard’s translation works well enough; it conveys the essential meaning of the
two opening sentences, and as we have seen, this is the translator’s goal. Yet, even in
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these opening lines, much of Breton’s style and subtext has already been lost. To begin,
the culture gap between the original text and the Anglophone reader has not been bridged
by the translation, which will almost certainly result in some degree of misinterpretation.
The proverb alluded to here is a French one: « Dis-moi qui tu hantes, je te dirai qui tu es,
» or “Tell me whom you haunt, I will tell you who you are.” The choice of this proverb is
very significant for the following section of the book, so Howard is right not to attempt to
adapt the passage to a similar English proverb. However, the Anglophone reader’s likely
unfamiliarity with the French proverb will inevitably make this passage more mysterious
in English than it is in the original French, frustrating the attempt to convey the passage’s
meaning. Proverbs like this one and other linguistic elements like idioms or figures of
speech are obvious difficulties for the translator. But as we shall see, the problems of
translation run much deeper.
Further, and perhaps more significantly, Howard has transformed the second
sentence from an interrogative to a declarative in order to avoid awkward syntax in
English. However, to maintain the lack of certainty conveyed by the interrogative, he
inserts “perhaps” to weaken the sentence’s declarative force. Also, the changes in in the
sentence’s internal punctuation are significant: the colon becomes a comma and the
second sentence is now a conditional statement in the “if… then…” format of
propositional logic. While this tactic might convey the literal meaning of the text, it has
greatly altered the style. In Howard’s version the narrator’s opening line of internal
enquiry is cut short and replaced with internal dialogue. The narrator’s mode of thinking
has been altered, and therefore the critically important automatic character of the text has

24

been destroyed by the rational efforts of the well meaning translator. In this way, the
translator’s attempt to convey the meaning of the text has frustrated itself.
If we accept that any attempt to translate a surrealist text will deprive it of its
artistic and political value, what are we to do? Should we simply abandon the translations
in favor of the original French? As we have seen, reading the original will give us more
direct access to the author’s automatic style. However, the mere possibility of rationally
conveying the meaning of the text undermines its subversive potential to escape the
confines of reason. This exposes an intrinsic weakness in the automatic text as an act of
revolt: No matter how unconscious the origins of a text may be, it cannot avoid being
rationalized in interpretation. Logic is so bound to perception that the reader will find or
project a reasoned meaning in even the most irrational of works. The more senseless it is
the more determined the reader becomes to make sense of it. Automatic methodology can
radicalize the writing process, but it does nothing to assure that the reading process will
undergo a parallel transformation. In order to revitalize the surrealist project, what is
needed is a method of foiling the reader’s natural inclinations.
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CHAPTER 4
BENJAMIN, SURREALISM AND “THE TASK OF THE TRANSLATOR”
In his essay, “The Task of the Translator” Benjamin rejects the traditional,
pragmatic view of translation and forms a radically different approach. As we saw in the
previous chapter, Benjamin’s view of translation diverges from the traditional one in that
he abandons the concern for the reader which is typically of central importance. In
addition, the translator should not focus on the meaning of the text which, in the
traditional conception, is the essential component to convey: “Its essential quality is not
statement or the imparting of information. Yet any translation which intends to perform a
transmitting function cannot transmit anything but information--hence, something
inessential. This is the hallmark of bad translations” (69). For Benjamin, this model of
communication rooted in the transmission of information is precisely what must be
subverted. One path for this subversion lies in a competing model of communication, the
story:
Historically, the various modes of communication have competed with one another. The
replacement of the older narration by information, of information by sensation, reflects the
increasing atrophy of experience. In turn, there is a contrast between all these forms and the story,
which is one of the oldest forms of communication. It is not the object of the story to convey a
happening per se, which is the purpose of information; rather, it embeds it in the life of the
storyteller in order to pass it on as experience to those listening. It thus bears the marks of the
potter’s hand. (On Some Motifs in Baudelaire 159)

The attempt to convey a meaning or “happening” will always be bound to the
form of information (which is itself bound to the logic of capitalism). To revolt against
this form of communication, another form is needed. As we have just seen, Benjamin
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certainly sees great potential in the form of the story in its ability to capture experience.
However, translation is another form which has advantages of its own, especially for the
project of reinvigorating surrealism (The Task of the Translator 70)13. As Benjamin goes
on to say:
A translation issues from the original--not so much from its life as from its afterlife. For a
translation comes later than the original, and since the important works of world literature never
find their translators at the time of their origin, their translation marks their stage of continued life.
(71)

Thus, even if surrealism is in fact dead, there is hope that revolutionary potential lies
within the “afterlife” found in translations: “The life of the originals attain in them to its
ever-renewed latest and most abundant flowering” (72). Thus, to shy away from
translation and retreat to the originals would only be a backward step for the movement.
But as we have seen, the translation of surrealist text is particularly problematic.
How are we to approach a project of radicalizing translation without succumbing to the
pitfalls discussed above? Benjamin’s discussion of translation is such a dramatic
departure from the typical view that we are left wondering how to approach any
Benjaminian translation. If we are neither to concern ourselves with the meaning of the
text nor with a consideration for the reader, what criteria are left to us to guide our
translation?
We can be sure that for Benjamin, language rather than content, is the essential
component. As he states: “Translation thus ultimately serves the purpose of expressing
the central reciprocal relationship between languages” (72). According to Benjamin, it is
by appreciating this kinship of languages that we gain an understanding of “pure
13

Zohn’s translation strangely renders Benjamin’s sentence: “Übersetzung ist eine Form” as “Translation
is a mode.” Weber argues that it is more correct to maintain the use of the word “Form” in the English, and
I follow his usage here (Weber, 56-58).
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language,” which he describes as “that element in a translation which goes beyond
transmittal of subject matter” (75). The key to this pure language is a re-conception of
intention. This returns us to our discussion of surrealism. Earlier, we rejected the
traditional model of translation because it failed to fulfill the revolutionary intentions of
the authors by subjecting automatic writing to conscious revision. In response, one could
imagine a technique of automatic translation, that is, an unreflecting interpretation of a
text from one language to another. Instead of rationally conveying meaning, the
automatic translator would unthinkingly transcribe his or her immediate impressions of
the text, line by line. While, contrary to aims of traditional translation, this would
distance the end result from the original, it would reinvest the work with subversive
potential, thereby fulfilling the intentions of the surrealist authors.
This automatic model of radicalizing translation may seem attractive for its
simplicity, but it would prove no less problematic than the original texts. As we saw
earlier, automatism cannot escape the normalizing effects of interpretation. However, just
because we cannot recapture the automatism the surrealists intended for their works does
not mean that intention must be left behind. Rather, Benjamin again invites us to rethink
one of our preconceived notions. In translating, we must think of the intention of the
word, rather than that of the author: “The task of the translator consists in finding that
intended effect [Intention] upon the language into which he [sic] is translating which
produces in it the echo of the original” (76).
Indeed, as Benjamin elaborates:
A real translation is transparent; it does not cover the original, does not block its light, but allows
the pure language, as though reinforced by its own medium, to shine upon the original all the more
fully. This may be achieved, above all, by a literal rendering of the syntax which proves words
rather than sentences to be the primary element of the translator. For if the sentence is the wall
before the language of the original, literalness is the arcade. (79)
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The intention of individual words, in relative isolation from the rest of the text, should be
the concern of the translator. This “word-by-word literalness” is the key to pure language
and the subversive potential that Benjaminian translation could hold (Weber 74). As
Benjamin explains:
In this pure language--which no longer means or expresses anything but is, as expressionless and
creative Word, that which is meant in all languages--all information, all sense, and all intention
finally encounter a stratum in which they are destined to be extinguished. This very stratum
furnishes a new and higher justification for free translation … It is the task of the translator to
release in his [sic] own language that pure language which is under the spell of another, to liberate
the language imprisoned in a work in his [sic] re-creation of that work. (80)

In this way, the particularities of a language, i.e. grammatical laws, are transcended in
translation. Benjamin scholar Samuel Weber explains that Benjaminian translation
reveals “the capacity of language to defy the general rules that allow it to function as a
medium of communication” (76). For Benjamin, then, translation presents the
opportunity for freedom.
The surrealists seek freedom in automatic language, outside from the tyranny of
logic. However, particular languages bear the impressions of the cultures from which
they emerge. If one is employing a capitalist language, even unconsciously, the
oppressive structures of capitalism are bound remain. However, if these linguistic
structures could themselves be subverted, then there might be hope of creating a text
outside of this oppression. In this way the surrealist project and that of Benjamin are
complementary. While surrealism promises to free language from conscious thought,
Benjaminian translation promises to free this language from its structure. Such a radical
approach to the translation of surrealist text would not only revitalize the movement, but
extend it to new domains.
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Returning now to the passage we examined earlier, I would offer the following
attempt at a Benjaminian translation of the opening of Nadja: “Who am I? If by
exception I were to rely on an adage: indeed why would everything not come back to
knowing whom I ‘haunt’?” This translation is a little more awkward than the one
proposed by Howard. Maintaining the punctuation and word order of the original has also
retained something of its flow, leaving the passage sounding at least somewhat odd to the
Anglophone ear. Of course, this would not be problematic for Benjamin. What, if
anything, could be rendered through translation in smooth, natural prose would only be
information. A successful translation should trouble our linguistic inclinations, not
reinforce them. To further emphasize this point, Benjamin cites Rudolf Pannwitz: “The
basic error of the translator is that he [sic] preserves the state in which his [sic] own
language happens to be instead of allowing his [sic] language to be powerfully affected
by the foreign tongue” (Task of the Translator 81).
Once the task of the translator is reconfigured, so is his or her creative role in the
translation. In the traditional framing, translation is only a means to an end, and therefore
the translator is not making any contribution of her or his own. The translator is supposed
to disappear completely, to preserve the illusion that the original author is speaking to the
reader without any outside intervention. The illusion is often so perfectly executed that
the translator’s name does not even appear on the cover of the book. But, in Benjamin’s
conception, translation can be viewed as having a positive literary value. In his essay,
“On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” Benjamin devotes an important section to a discussion
of Baudelaire’s translation of Poe’s story “The Man of the Crowd,” indicating that a
translation can be considered a significant part of an author’s oeuvre. Further, Benjamin
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celebrates the literary value of the translations of the German Romanticists: “their own
great translations testify to their sense of the essential nature and the dignity of this
literary [form]14” (Task of the Translator 76). If undertaken with the right frame of mind,
our translation project for surrealism could have substantive value of its own, especially
if it can radicalize surrealist writing to the point of (re)attaining its revolutionary impact.

14

See above note on the use of “form” in place of Zohn’s “mode.”
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION:
A PHOTOGRAPHIC MODEL OF TRANSLATION
Once we have accepted that Benjamin’s theory of translation is the key to
revitalizing surrealism, we are presented with a new problem: We are never given a clear
idea of what such a translation of surrealism would look like. “The Task of the
Translator” is written as an introduction to Benjamin’s translation of Baudelaire’s
Tableaux parisiens, but Benjamin does not give an example of how his re-conceptions
have influenced his translation. What is clear is that a Benjaminian translation should not
be a re-translation. Benjamin cautions that translation is not to be conflated with other
literary forms: “As translation is a [form] of its own, the task of the translator, too, may
be regarded as distinct and clearly different from the task of the poet” (76).
To translate a translation would be to mistake a translator for a poet. However,
this does not mean that the original cannot be translated again: “Thus translation,
ironically, transplants the original into a more definitive linguistic realm since it can no
longer be displaced by a secondary rendering. The original can only be raised there anew
at other points of time” (Task of the Translator 75). As Benjamin further explains in his
essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”:
Mechanical reproduction emancipates the work of art from its parasitical dependence on the ritual.
To an ever greater degree the work of art reproduced becomes the work of art designed for
reproducibility. From a photographic negative, for example, one can make any number of prints;
to ask for the “authentic” print makes no sense. But the instant the criterion of authenticity ceases
to be applicable to artistic production, the total function of art is reversed. Instead of being based
on ritual, it begins to be based on another practice—politics. (224)
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The line of thinking Benjamin applies here to photography is easily applied to
translation as well. The original text, like a photographic negative, can be infinitely
reproduced. For this reason, there can never be a final, definitive translation; there is
always the possibility of further reproductions. Indeed, this dissolution of authenticity in
the infinite capacity for reproduction and dissemination opens further political
possibilities for subverting the proprietary logic of capitalism.
In addition, the analogy of the photograph invites us to consider a component of
surrealism that has been conspicuously absent from our earlier discussion: visual media.
Though this paper has mostly been concerned with surrealist writing, many of the most
influential and enduring works of the surrealist oeuvre are paintings, sculptures, and
photographs. By understanding the qualities of surrealist images, we may develop an idea
of what shape our translations should take. In her essay “The Photographic Conditions of
Surrealism,” Art critic Rosalind Krauss explains that photography is a medium
particularly suited to Surrealism. Reflecting on the idealist revolution of the mind
demanded by Breton, Krauss describes the state of surreality as “nature convulsed into a
kind of writing” (29).
Krauss asserts that this convulsion is the common thread through all of the wide
variety of surrealist endeavors: “What unites all surrealist production is precisely this
experience of nature as representation, physical matter as writing” (31). The surrealist
resolution of dream and reality would dissolve the concept of metaphor. In surreality,
things are not symbolic of ideas, things and ideas are one. In a similar way, image and
language become one in the surrealist photograph:
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The photographs are not interpretations of reality… They are presentations of that very reality as
configured, or coded, or written. The experience of nature as sign, or nature as representation,
comes “naturally” then to photography. (29)

Because of the immediacy of its perception, the image is more intimately tied to reality,
while the symbolic, mediating function of language makes it a form of representation. A
synthesis of these two is the surrealist ideal. It is for this reason that Breton integrated
photography into his books Nadja and L’Amour fou. Each photograph in these books is
captioned by a sentence that is also found in the body of the text itself. The photograph is
not merely a reference to the relevant section of the book; it is almost as if the sentence is
the photograph: the two form a whole. As surrealist photography can make images more
like writing, a successful translation could make surrealist writing more like the image.
This, then, helps us conceive the shape which the translated text should take: an
imagistic text, a fusion of reality and representation, of “signified and signifier” (Krauss
22). This is what Benjamin claims can be achieved by accessing pure language in
translation: “to turn the symbolizing into the symbolized, to regain pure language fully
formed in the linguistic flux, is the tremendous and only capacity of translation” (80).
Unfortunately, even Weber is forced to admit “How this is to be conceived, concretely,
remains elusive” (Translatability 75). Benjamin is a notoriously difficult thinker and “The
Task of the Translator” is particularly characteristic of this quality in his writing.
However, pure language, if indeed accessible, would be well worth pursuing for our
translation project.
In conclusion, the task of the translator, though different, is complementary to that
of the writer. This is particularly true in the case of surrealism. Even if time has rendered
surrealism largely sterile and lifeless, the translator can enliven them again. However, the
traditional emphasis of transferring meaning threatens to repeat the capitalist structures in
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the very works that attempt to subvert them. Instead, if Benjamin’s pure language is
given the privileged position, then surrealism could be radicalized beyond even its
original subversive capacity. Indeed, as Benjamin explains “One of the foremost tasks of
art has always been the creation of a demand which could be fully satisfied only later”
(Mechanical Reproduction 237). Until a translation emerges that can fulfill the demands
created by the surrealist movement, we are left to wonder what new ground surrealism
would hope to explore outside the constraints of both logical and linguistic structure.
Hopefully such a translation project can be the manifestation of the speculation with
which Nadeau concluded the afterward to the 1957 edition of Histoire du Surréalisme:
“Then after it will come, perhaps, those who will truly put an end to metaphors” (230).
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